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  Political economy arguments have been at the heart of debates and controversies on strategies 
of transition from socialism to capitalism.   
  For exampl e, advocates of a "big bang" approach to transition have argued for a fast and 
comprehensive implementation of all major reforms. Speed was of the essence, they argued, because   
there was a "window of opportunity" (or a "honeymoon period" or a  "period of  exceptional politics") 
created by the establishment of democracy. During this period, they argued, governments adopt 
reforms as fast as possible (for example, Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Balcerowicz, 1995) and attempt to 
create irreversibility for these reform s (for example, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995).   
  On the other side, those who opposed the big bang approach often advocated a gradualist 
strategy, which emphasized the need for a precise sequencing of reforms. The political economy 
argument in favor o f gradualism was that an appropriate sequencing of reforms would provide 
demonstrated successes to build upon, thus creating constituencies for further reforms (for example, 
Dewatripont and Roland, 1992a, b, 1995; Wei, 1997; McMillan and Naughton, 1992; Li twack and 
Qian, 1999). In China, the success of decollectivization built support for later reforms. Similarly, it was 
thought that in Central and Eastern Europe, successful entry of small and medium enterprises could 
build support for later reforms in the  state sector.  
  Political economy arguments, along with being used in the context of the pace and sequencing 
of reforms, have also been used extensively to explain or justify many aspects of the transition process. 
For example, mass privatization, involving  the giveaway of state assets to citizens (as in the Czech 
Republic) or to workers (as in Russia) was designed to overcome political constraints to transition 
(Svejnar, 1989; Weitzman, 1991; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995;  Shleifer and Treisman, 2000; 
Roland and Verdier, 1993; Schmidt, 2000; Biais and Perotti, 1998). To take another example, a little 
further afield, China implemented "dual - track liberalization," under which plan contracts between 
enterprises are maintained but frozen at a preexisting le vel and price liberalization is implemented "at 
the margin" for any production beyond the planned contract. The political economy argument for dual -  3
track liberalization is that it was a way to liberalize prices without eliminating preexisting rents of 
econ omic agents (Lau, Qian and Roland, 1997, 2000).  
  Political economy arguments have also been used to explain the striking difference in economic 
performance across transition countries.  While all transition economies experienced a fall in output at 
the sta rt of the process, most countries in central and eastern Europe recovered growth after a few 
years, while Russia and most former Soviet Union countries (apart from the Baltic states of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania) saw little or no recovery of growth thro ugh most of the 1990s. One political 
economy argument often made is that the extent of state capture and rent - seeking was much more 
important in former Soviet Union countries than in central Europe and that this difference goes a long 
way in explaining dif ferences in output performance (EBRD, 2000; Hellman and Shankerman, 2000).   
Another political economy argument suggests that central European countries were expected 
to access the European Union, which enhanced incentives to create patterns of law enforcem ent, law 
compliance and protection of property rights, while in former Soviet Union countries where prospects 
of accession to the EU are virtually nil, no such incentives existed (Roland, 1997; Roland and Verdier, 
1999).    
  The overriding importance of pol itical constraints in the transition process has led to 
developments of the theory of the political economy of reform (for surveys, see Dewatripont and 
Roland, 1995; Roland, 2000). What are the main insights from that theory? How does it reflect the 
transi tion reality? What have we learned and what do we still need to learn? The present article will 
attempt to answer those questions.   
  The theory of the political economy of transition belongs to a more fundamental trend in 
economic research in recent years  to integrate the political process into the analysis of economic 
problems. Political economy issues are being introduced and analyzed in all areas of economics: trade, 
macroeconomic policy, regulation, public finances, financial economics, labor, and other s. The tools of 
game theory developed over the last decades now allow the research to integrate the analysis of 
economic and political processes using unified tools of analysis. This impressive synthesis is discussed,   4
for example, in the two recent graduat e textbooks by Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Drazen (2000).   
     
 
The Theory of the Political Economy of Transition Reforms  
 
  Two broad strands can be identified in the literature on the political economy of reforms: 
normative and positive. The normative  political economy of reforms focuses on the decision - making 
problem of reformers (not necessarily welfare - maximizing ones) subject to political constraints. Models 
in this literature make broad use of the "agenda - setting hypothesis," according to which th e executive 
branch of government has monopoly power over the design and sequencing of reform packages that 
are put to vote in the legislature or in a popular referendum (McKelvey, 1976: Romer and Rosenthal, 
1983). In these models, no amendments to the prop osed reform packages are typically allowed, so that 
the reform can be viewed as a take - it - or - leave - it offer made to the voters.
1  One then tries to derive 
general principles on what sort of reform package should be proposed.   
  In contrast, the literature on  the positive political economy of reforms attempts to analyze the 
clash of interest groups. The focus is less on deriving policy recommendations than on trying to 
understand the evolution of the balance of power across countries and across time. In the tr ansition 
context, the positive analysis of reforms has been somewhat less developed than the normative analysis.  
 
Normative Political Economy: Enacting Reform and Keeping Reform  
     Reformers face two types of political constraints. One set of political co nstraints are 
feasibility constraints, called  ex ante  political constraints, that can block decision - making and prevent 
reforms from being accepted. The second set of political constraints, called  ex post  political constraints, 
are related to backlash and  policy reversal after reforms have been implemented and outcomes 
observed (Roland, 1994).   
     The  ex ante  and  ex post  political constraints will be effectively the same, unless there is   5
uncertainty and reversal costs. In the presence of uncertainty, certa in reforms may be opposed by a 
majority before being enacted, even though those same reforms would end up benefiting the majority 
and would not be reversed if implemented (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). Thus, the resolution of 
uncertainty along the reform pa th can shift the majorities in favor or against reforms, an insight which 
plays an important role in designing a politically feasible sequence of reforms. Reversal costs typically 
make it harder to enact a reform, since it is recognized that when the refor m is enacted it will be costly 
to turn back. Thus, reversal costs increase the  ex ante  constraints on reform but reduce the  ex post  
constraints.   
  Uncertainty and reversal costs often work together. This will especially be true if there is 
aggregate uncert ainty  about the reform outcomes. Individual uncertainty arises when there is 
uncertainty about the identities of winners and losers of reform. Aggregate uncertainty means there is 
also uncertainty about the economy - wide effects of given reform programs; sa y, whether the overall 
effects will be positive or negative. When aggregate uncertainty is important, high reversal costs make 
people more reluctant to accept reforms that may turn out to give disastrous outcomes and moreover 
be hard to reverse. The politi cal economy of reform can be viewed as an issue of how to get reforms 
enacted in the first place, which involves relaxing the  ex ante  political constraints, and then how to have 
the reforms stay in place, which means relaxing the  ex post  political constrai nts.   
 
How to Relax Political Constraints So That Reforms can be Enacted  
  There are four possible strategies for easing political constraints so that reforms can be enacted. 
a) building reform packages that give compensating transfers to losers from reform s; b) making 
reforms only partial to reduce opposition; c) creating institutions that make credible a commitment to 
compensating transfers; or d) wait for a deterioration of the status quo to make the reform more 
attractive. We will discuss each in turn.     6
  Giving  compensating transfers  to losers from reform to buy their acceptance is an obvious way 
to help in enacting a reform. But in the real world, and in the transition economies, such transfers can 
be difficult to enact.   
     A first difficulty with comp ensating transfers is that redistributive transfers must be financed 
by collecting revenues, which usually involves distortionary costs. These distortions can be especially 
high in countries with chronic budget deficits where government must resort to infl ationary taxation to 
finance given expenditures. In the transition context, fiscal administrations are relatively inexperienced 
(they did not exist under communism) and enforcement of tax collection is low.  
    A second difficulty with compensating transfer s involves asymmetric information about the 
losses from reform (Lewis et al., 1990; Dewatripont and Roland, 1992). Take the case where political 
acceptability must be gained for closing an enterprise, thus laying off all its workers. Some of these 
expect t o find jobs easily, and will not lose much from redundancies, whereas others will have a much 
harder time and will need to be compensated more heavily to accept to be laid off. But if one cannot 
tell which worker is in which category, then all workers woul d have to be paid high compensations 
because they are undistinguishable, and because workers with lower exit costs have an incentive to 
pretend they have high exit costs. The cost of those compensations would be much higher than in the 
absence of asymmetri c information and workers with low exit costs would gain high rents. Given this 
problem of imperfect information, a common outcome is a partial layoff in which workers with the 
highest exit costs can keep their jobs.  
     A third difficulty with compensatin g transfers is related to weak commitment power of 
decision - makers. If decision - makers cannot credibly commit to a continuous flow of transfers to losers 
from reform, they will not be able to secure the political acceptance of the losers unless they are gi ven 
today the net present value of future compensating transfers, which is likely be infeasible due to the 
short - term budget (and borrowing) constraints faced by governments.  Weak commitment power is 
related to the fact that the coalition in power today c annot commit future coalitions to continuation of 
given policies. Numerous efficiency - enhancing reforms are blocked because the proposed   7
accompanying transfers are not credible enough. A vivid example is reform of European Common 
Agricultural Policy, where  a move from price support to income support has been blocked for a long 
time by farming lobbies for fear that income support could easily be discontinued in the future. In the 
transition economies of central and eastern Europe, securing political acceptan ce to restructuring 
measures such as the devolution of social assets or large - scale redundancies can be facilitated if there is 
enough credibility for a social safety net providing enough compensating transfers  --  but such 
credibility is difficult for newl y installed governments in tumultuous times to provide.
2    
     Partial reform , usually in the framework of a gradualist strategy, has some clear 
disadvantages. It yields less efficiency gains. There may be losses of complementarities between 
reforms. It does  not resolve all uncertainty about future outcomes and thus yields less learning about 
the future. Indeed, at an extreme, partial reform may even end up being pure noise, chaotic and 
disorganizing, yielding lower outcomes than under the status quo and zero  learning about the 
consequences of a complete reform.   
  However, partial reform also has several potential advantages over full reform.  It is less costly 
in terms of compensation payments to losers. Indeed, if there is considerable heterogeneity in the 
d istribution of losses from reform and in addition high efficiency costs of raising funds, then the gains 
from not needing to compensate the highest - cost losers may offset the efficiency losses of raising 
additional funds  --  and the partial reform would the n have a higher level of social benefit, after taking 
compensation into account, than a full reform (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992).  
  If partial reform is less costly to reverse than full reform, political acceptability can be easier 
than for full reform be cause it provides an option of early reversal (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). If 
after partial reform is implemented, a continuation of reform towards full reform seems unattractive to 
a majority, because the signals given by partial reform about the futur e are not promising enough, then 
it is always possible to come back to the status quo. On the other hand, if the signals given by early 
reform are promising enough, then the reforms can continue with greater support. Gradualism thus 
lowers the cost of expe rimenting with reform and thus makes a move away from the status quo more   8
easily acceptable to a majority.  
  Partial reform can also build constituencies for further reform. This can be achieved by making 
the status quo less attractive. Two principles can b e distinguished here: the use of  "divide and rule 
tactics" (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992, Wei, 1999) and the optimal choice of sequencing of reforms 
(Dewatripont and Roland, 1995).   
  To illustrate the role of "divide and rule" tactics, let us take again t he example of deciding on 
layoffs. Assume for example that two - thirds of workers must be laid off in a sector of the economy and 
that political constraints require that restructuring plans be accepted by a majority of these workers. 
However, workers view t heir jobs as safe and valuable and intend to hang on to them. One strategy for 
management in this situation is to build coalitions for laying off a series of small groups, without fully 
compensating those groups and thus making each group worse off. When c onfronted with such tactics, 
the status quo no longer looks so safe or attractive; it now includes the chance of suffering forced 
losses. With the ground prepared in this way, a majority of workers may be willing to support a 
restructuring plan, including  those who know that they will immediately be laid off, as long as the 
compensation they receive is better than what they will receive if they are caught up in one of the next 
rounds of ongoing partial layoffs. If agents know that rejection of a current ref orm plan can lead to the 
adoption of a redundancy plan that would hurt them even more, they may prefer to accept being made 
redundant today at better conditions.  
     To illustrate the role of optimal sequencing of reforms, let us take the case of privatiza tion. 
Assume that there is uncertainty about the gains from privatization. Define a "bad" aggregate outcome 
as one where privatization induces high unemployment levels with little investment by new owners and 
a negative impact on the economy. Define a "goo d" privatization outcome as one where redundancies 
are kept at a reasonable level, and where new investment eventually leads to employment creation at 
higher wages and to growth. Assume that there are two parties, a reform party and an anti - reform 
party. A ssume that the reform party holds office and only has a mandate for partial privatization, say 
because the constituencies of some of its elected representatives oppose full privatization. If the   9
government starts by privatizing those enterprises having a h igher likelihood of a “bad” outcome, then 
the resolution of uncertainty is more likely to lead to welfare losses for many and thus to build 
constituencies that would bring the anti - reform party to power after an election and thus lead to reform 
reversal. I f however, one starts by privatizing those enterprises with better prospects for a “good” 
outcome, then a positive resolution of uncertainty will build electoral support for reform continuation, 
giving the incumbent a mandate to widen the privatization pro cess. Indeed, the uncertainty resolution 
after the initial reform step creates either losers or winners whose vote may be decisive for reform 
continuation or reversal. Winners from initial privatization will be more willing to support continuation 
of priva tization, and thus reelect the incumbent reformers, than before the uncertainty resolution, even 
if the expected outcome for the next phase of privatization is less positive. Indeed, the positive 
uncertainty resolution gives them stronger stakes in opposin g reversal of privatization.  
  Although policy - makers cannot in general commit in advance to keep paying flows of 
compensating transfers, they can in some cases  create institutions with a commitment to transfers . At a 
general level, one form of commitment i s extending the voting franchise  --  that is, ensuring a high 
participation in elections of the poorer segments of the population (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000). 
Since elections follow a "one man, one vote" rule and since median income is typically lower tha n mean 
income, democratic elections are an important institution for committing to transfers. While 
commitment to transfers can offer benefits when such transfers needed to gain political acceptability, it 
obviously also entails economic costs.  
     In some  cases, the only option for reformers is to  wait for a deterioration of the status quo  so 
as to gain acceptance for change. However, decision - making paralysis may occur if political decision -
making is characterized by a war of attrition between opposing co alitions who try to push the burden 
of the reforms on the other coalition (Alesina and Drazen, 1992).   
 
How to Prevent Reforms from Being Reversed   
  There are some important trade - offs at work between relaxing  ex ante  political constraints and   10
relaxing  ex  post  political constraints. If one wants to reduce the chance of reforms being reversed, one 
should not let pass by any window of opportunity to pass important reform packages. However, a 
certain flexibility in allowing for reversibility of reforms is ofte n desirable, especially when there is 
aggregate uncertainty. For example, the Russian mass privatization program was designed so as make 
it hard to reverse, as assets were given away to insiders. Reversing such privatization would thus have 
created enormou s political resistance. Moreover, since existing state structures were deliberately 
weakened in the process, the government had become too weak to engineer a reversal. However, when 
mass privatization was implemented, it was associated with assets being st ripped from corporations for 
private uses, weak economic performance, strong increase in inequalities and in corruption and, last but 
not least, increased capture of the state by oligarchs (Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, 2000). In this 
case, greater revers ibility, with the goal of implementing a better privatization policy, might have 
prevented a reduction in welfare.    
  More generally however, relaxing ex ante and ex post political constraints go hand in hand. 
The best way to create irreversibility is ofte n to design reform packages via adequate sequencing and 
compensating transfers so as to create broad support.   
       
The Positive Political Economy of Transition Reforms  
  The positive political economy of reform seeks to explain differences in the extent of  rent -
seeking and how special interests may effectively capture regulatory bodies. For example, in seeking to 
determine the extent and effect of rent - seeking, answers are sought in the structure of the institutions 
that affect the costs and benefits of ren t - seeking: the number of players who have an effective veto, the 
extent of separation of powers, whether the political regime is presidential or parliamentary, the 
structure of the legislature, and so on.   
  Such analysis may be insightful in many countries  where the political and legal institutions have 
been in existence for a long time and can be viewed with sufficient confidence as exogenous variables. 
But in the specific context of transition economies, the institutions themselves are a product of the   11
tr ansition process and must be seen as an endogenous outcome, which complicates the analysis.   
  Sonin (1999) has built a very insightful model of rent - seeking that sheds light on many of the 
processes observed in transition countries. He notes that in the tr ansition context, rich agents like the 
Russian oligarchs benefit from low security of property rights, since low security allows them to 
convert corporate and social assets to their private use. Thus, these oligarchs seek to capture 
government decision - mak ing to prevent reforms that would enhance security of property rights, and 
can exploit economies of scale in rent - seeking to do so. The insight is new in the sense that one might 
have thought that rich agents always favor security of property rights and th at challenges to its security 
would come from poor agents. The model thus shows how, for political economy reasons, a high initial 
level of inequality in wealth and power can lead to long - lasting insecurity of property rights.   
  In the transition context,  the question of rent - seeking is thus tied to the initial distribution of 
wealth and power. One can argue that a high concentration of wealth and power like in Russia is the 
result of the mass privatization policy chosen favoring the insiders (Black, Kraakm an and Tarassova, 
2000; Alexeev, 1999; Polishchuk, 1999). However, the choice of the mass privatization policy itself 
can also be seen as the result of prior rent - seeking activities (Bolton and Roland, 1992; Roland, 1996), 
which raises the question of why  this form of mass privatization was employed in Russia and the Czech 
Republic, for example, but rejected (partially or totally) in Poland and Hungary.  One hypothesis that 
has not yet fully been explored (certainly not by economists) is the cross - country d ifference in the 
extent of pre - existing civil society (Putnam, 1993) before transition. Here, for example, we see a strong 
contrast between the situation of Poland and that of Russia. Poland had powerful social networks, 
including the Catholic church and t he Solidarity trade union. But in Russia and in other countries of the 
former Soviet Union, hardly any social networks existed independent of the Communist party and 
dissident activity had been strongly repressed. It would be useful to investigate whether  such 
differences can explain why former networks of oligarchs and insiders emerged as a much more 
powerful force in the beginning of transition in Russia as compared to Poland.   
  When trying to understand the positive political economy of reforms in transi tion countries, it is   12
important to have a better understanding of the social and political initial conditions of reforms, which 
should reach beyond the economic initial conditions that have often been analyzed in the literature so 
far.   
 
Lessons in Politic al Economy from the Transition Experience  
 
     How relevant has the theory of the political economy of reforms been in understanding the 
transition experience of the past 10 years or so? What are the broad stylized facts that come out of that 
experience?   
  Before looking at the economic outcomes, it is useful to look at some broad stylized facts with 
respect to politics in transition countries. Table 1 reviews some stylized facts.  
INSERT TABLE 1  
  One should note that Central European countries have opted fo r parliamentary regimes, the 
main form of government in Western Europe, whereas most former Soviet Union countries, with the 
notable exception of Baltic countries, have opted for presidential regimes, usually with strong 
concentration of powers in the hand s of the president. In such kind of presidential regimes, party 
politics does not play an important role, governments are not formed according to partisan alignment 
following legislative elections but designed by the president. This is why some columns in  table 1 are 
left blank for Russia and the Ukraine. The difference in average time between elections reflects the time 
it took in various countries to stabilize the political system. Parliamentary Hungary and Slovenia have 
been very stable from the beginnin g from that point of view, but so has presidential Ukraine. In general, 
after an initial period of institution - building, the time between the most two recent elections has been of 
four years. Average government duration has however been in general low, wit h the notable exception 
of Hungary again. Government duration between the most two recent elections has in general been 
longer. Note however that it was shorter in the Czech republic, Estonia, Romania, Russia and the 
Ukraine, reflecting political tensions  or instability. The average number of parties is rather normal for   13
parliamentary democracies though rather high in Poland. Transition governments have more often been 
right wing or center right rather than left wing or center left, not a surprise given tha t left wing 
governments usually include former communist parties. Former communists have continued to play a 
major role in Romania, and to a lesser extent in Bulgaria. In Slovakia, we classified Meciar’s party, 
HZDS as left, not exactly suitable since it i s mainly nationalist. Note finally a huge variation in the 
reelection of incumbents. Since most governments are coalition governments, we considered a 
government reelected when one of its major parties was part of the coalition formed after the election 
an d when the main orientation of the coalition (left or right) was maintained. No coalition has however 
remained the same in any transition country following elections. In the Czech republic, the party of V. 
Klaus, ODS, managed to survive until the most rece nt elections. In Romania, former communists who 
formed the National Salvation Front and later the Social Democratic Party have remained very 
powerful. Slovenia’s case is different. Governments have usually been to the right of the center and 
there has been  a lot of continuity between successive governments but no single party has played a 
dominant role throughout the transition period.  
       
Explaining Trends in Economic Performance   
     Transition economies have had different patterns of economic performanc e. Poland's 
transition path is characteristic for the central and eastern European "success stories" in transition. It 
experienced a fall in real GDP of about 20 percent in the two years after price liberalization started in 
1989, but recovered growth rath er quickly and exceeded its pre - transition real GDP level after six or 
seven years of transition. Russia has had a prolonged output decline of about 40 percent of real GDP in 
the four years following the beginning of transition in 1991, and while that decl ine has leveled, 
sustained growth has yet to emerge. However, when China liberalized prices in 1984, its real GDP 
expanded steadily and grew by almost 80 percent over the following decade.
3    
  This huge variation in overall economic performance in transitio n countries was certainly not 
predicted by most economists. It suggests that models which build on the assumption that aggregate   14
uncertainty is important are certainly on the right track.   
  One might reasonably assert that aggregate uncertainty applies mor e to the results of the 
privatization process in transition, and less to restructuring and sectoral reallocation. There has been 
enormous variation in outcomes of privatization policies. Prior to implementation of privatization 
policies, debates concerned  mostly the efficiency of various privatization schemes. However, a major 
effect of privatization policies in some countries is the amount of asset - stripping that has been 
associated to privatization processes and the ensuing consequences like low stock mar ket liquidity, 
formation of large financial industrial groups, increases in rent - seeking activities and state capture, 
political instability, and so on. These important effects were largely unanticipated. Conversely, sectoral 
reallocation is fairly well un derstood and has not yielded a huge variation in outcomes. The theories of 
sectoral reallocation that were developed quite early in the transition process seem to broadly cover 
actual paths of sectoral reallocation (Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; Atkeson and  Kehoe, 1996; 
Castanheira and Roland, 1999; Boeri, 2000). Empirical verification of these theories has also been 
generally encouraging (Boeri, 2000; Jurajda and Terrell, 2001).   
  Although China is not the focus of this paper or this symposium, China is the  great success 
story among the transition economics in terms of having avoided a deep recession and moving quickly 
to a rapid growth path. Thus, it is useful to highlight here some of the political economy issues raised 
about the Chinese transition success.    
  The Chinese experience is often dismissed by analysts of the transition of the Soviet bloc 
countries on the grounds that China is a dictatorship and not a democracy, and therefore that political 
constraints were less of a problem in the implementation o f reforms than in central and eastern Europe. 
However, it is very difficult to disentangle what aspects of China's transition are uniquely due to the 
absence of democracy.   
  One interesting Chinese institution, especially from the political economy point o f view, is that 
China chose to liberalize prices in 1984 through a dual - track system. For planned output, planned 
prices were maintained and planned contracts for supplies and deliveries were kept frozen at a pre -  15
existing level and were enforced. However,  prices and quantities were liberalized in all sectors for 
additional marginal output, which meant that producers were free to set prices, to contract freely with 
customers of their choice and to keep all profits made on the market track. Lau, Qian and Rola nd 
(2000) have emphasized the Pareto - improving property of the dual - track. By construction, the system 
preserves the rents that various economic agents have under the planning system, and thus does not 
hurt them with liberalization, while creating new rent s on the market track. Price liberalization can thus 
be achieved without creating losers, and thus without violating political constraints. One could thus 
speculate that if China had been a democracy, it would  not  have been more difficult to enact reforms  of 
this type. The dual - track system has also other properties that are very relevant in the transition 
context. Due to the continued enforcement of the plan contracts, the disorganization effects of price 
liberalization can be reduced (Roland and Verdier,  1999a), thereby preventing the output fall otherwise 
generally observed in transition economies, including even the more successful ones like Poland. 
Finally, one can argue that the dual - track system helped prevent the collapse of existing government 
struc tures because government kept a direct control over economic resources without having to 
depend solely on fiscal revenues to finance essential activities like law enforcement, which are 
themselves crucial to efficient tax collection and many other purposes  (Roland and Verdier, 1999b).   
  In terms of understanding the difference in transition paths between central European countries 
like Poland on one hand and Russia and the former Soviet Union, on the other hand, geopolitical 
factors are quite important, alt hough they have been underestimated since the beginning of transition. 
Economists trying to understand transition have often viewed it as an ideological shift towards 
democracy and the market. But in geopolitical terms, transition represents the shift of c entral Europe 
and the Baltic states toward western Europe and the United States. Indeed, to important parts of 
populations in those countries, the single most important factor about transition is the change from the 
status of a satellite country of the Sov iet empire to that of a country belonging to the western block. 
Transition represents a unique historical opportunity for several nations to put down an anchor in 
western Europe or even to join the European Union. In addition, the prospect of this connecti on to   16
central and eastern Europe focuses expectations and gives credibility to the political and economic 
process of transition. Entry to the European Union implies adopting the political and economic system 
of the West. The potential reward of belonging t o the club of Western nations makes it more 
worthwhile to undergo the cost of transition. Moreover, the geopolitical factor increases the perceived 
cost of reversing transition policies, since such reversals would raise the risk of being left out of the 
We stern club, an outcome that many in central and eastern Europe would view as disastrous.  
  This geopolitical factor may be strong enough to explain why countries from central Europe 
did not suffer from the type of government collapse, anarchy and general di ffusion of criminality, inside 
and outside government, that Russia and other countries from the former Soviet Union have been 
facing (Roland and Verdier, 1999b). The ability to enforce the law and to protect property rights seems 
to be a key reason why cen tral Europe recovered from their fall in output, while Russia and other 
countries not facing the prospect of entry to the European Union experienced a much more prolonged 
decline of output.  
  The geopolitical impact of transition for Russia is quite differe nt. In Russia, transition 
represents the loss of the Soviet empire and also of territories, as the Ukraine or the Baltic states that 
had belonged to Tsarist Russia. This loss is a wound to Russian nationalist pride. It also implies 
uncertainty for the fami lies of those who have relatives among the millions of Russians living in the 
former Soviet republics and who became "immigrants" in former Soviet territories, often with the 
status of second - class citizen. The trauma of the loss of superpower status, simi lar in a way to the 
trauma experience by Germany after World War I, could be, to a certain extent, compensated for by 
economic gains from transition. Unfortunately, such gains have not materialized so far for the majority 
of Russians. Entry of Russia into  the European Union is neither expected nor especially desired. 
Russia's enormous size implies that the possibility of gains from foreign direct investment must be 
limited, and thus less allluring.   
  It is thus no wonder that resistance to transition proved  much harder in the former Soviet 
Union than in central and eastern Europe, as witnessed by the greater difficulties in requiring   17
enterprises to face their own losses and in adopting macroeconomc stabilization measures.   
  Geopolitical considerations play a  role in explaining why a version of China's dual - track 
approach was not tried in central and eastern Europe, at least at the level of trade across countries. 
Trade between the Soviet - bloc economies was planned and organized under the auspices of the 
Counc il for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Early in the 1990s, international organizations like 
the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development made efforts to prevent disruption of trade between  former CMEA countries. Essentially, 
the plans were to introduce some form of a dual - track approach, which would facilitate maintaining 
existing trade contracts, while leaving the freedom to sign new contracts, mainly with western business 
partners. Howeve r, these attempts were unsuccessful. The breakdown of trade patterns across the 
former Soviet bloc, including both the breakdown of CMEA and the separation of trade that had been 
within the Soviet Union to trade between separate countries, has been conside red the single most 
important explanatory factor for the general fall of output in the region (for example, Rodrik, 1992).   
  This breakdown of trade has generally been perceived as an exogenous shock  --  part of the 
process of transition. However, from a po litical economy perspective the breakdown of CMEA was 
not foreordained, but rather an endogenous outcome of policy choices. In early 1990, when 
Czechoslovak and the Polish governments insisted on regaining their freedom of export with respect to 
CMEA agree ments. The Soviets at that time responded by insisting that imports from the Soviet Union 
would from 1991 onwards be paid at world prices and in hard currency. The CMEA breakdown was 
thus an economic consequence of the political will prevailing in central  European countries to leave the 
Soviet bloc and to be the first to knock at the door of the European Union.  
  The dual - track system of price liberalization was also not implemented inside countries. One 
possible explanation is that reformist governments wan ted to use their window of opportunity to create 
irreversibility by completely dismantling the planning system, even at the cost of suffering an output 
fall. One must also add that reformists in power at the time, as well as the main western economic 
advis ors, shared the belief that price liberalization was more likely to boost output than to reduce it.   18
Even if the dual - track approach had been tried in a country like Russia, it would probably have failed 
because of the government collapse that followed the  implosion of Communism after the failed putsch 
of 1991. Such a collapse would have made any contract enforcement difficult to achieve, which is still 
to a great extent the case in Russia today given the weakness of the state and the corruption of the 
justi ce system and government administration.  
 
Sequencing  
  The sequence of reforms in transition economies are roughly in line with what the prediction of 
political economy theory suggesting that reforms expected to be more popular should start first. For 
examp le, in all of Central and Eastern Europe, democratic reforms preceded economic reforms. 
Aspirations for democracy were very strong throughout the region and support for economic reform 
was less strong than support for democracy.  
     Apart from political re forms, certain other institutional changes are relatively uncontroversial 
and can thus be decided at an early stage of reforms. For example, Fingleton et al. (1996) have argued 
that the establishment of institutions for competition policy should be among t he first reforms to be 
implemented in transition economies, a particularly important reform given the monopolistic structure 
of industry inherited from central planning. In practice, competition laws have generally been passed 
rather early in the transitio n process, in line with the theory. This example also emphasizes the danger 
that can be associated to a wrong sequencing. Privatization without effective competition policy puts 
existing monopolies in private hands, which may in turn have enough power to c apture the state 
apparatus to prevent the introduction of competition policy as well as any measure that is opposed to 
their interests, as the Russian experience has shown.    
  Another important early step in the sequence of transition reforms is to encourag e the 
development of a small private sector prior to more comprehensive reforms. Liberalizing the small 
private sector is often an early popular measure that provides a supply response in emerging markets.  
In Hungary, for example, the small private sector  was already producing about 10 percent of industrial   19
output by 1990 (Hare and Revesz, 1992). In China, the non - state sector's share of industrial output 
was already 22 percent in 1978, thus providing a basis for its growth to 47 percent in 1991 as 
liberal ization occured (Qian and Xu, 1992).  In Vietnam, radical price liberalization and stabilization 
programs were implemented in 1989. By then, the private sector in agriculture and manufacturing 
already occupied 60 percent of GDP and 85 percent of the labor  force. As in most countries where big 
bang price liberalization was implemented, Vietnamese industry experienced an output fall in 1989. 
However, this fall was more than compensated by impressive growth in agriculture, thus still leading to 
positive growth  that year (Dollar and Ljunggren, 1997).  Here also, the prior existence of a viable 
private sector buffered the shocks of economic liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization and 
facilitated a supply response.   
  Sequencing arguments have been applied t o privatization, too. In transition economies, the best 
firms tend to be privatized first; for examples, see Gatsios (1992) on Hungary, Carlin and Mayer 
(1992) on East Germany, Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (1999) on the Czech Republic, and Frydman et al. 
(1993)  for all countries in transition. The result of privatizing more profitable firms first is to create 
political support and goodwill for further privatization and other reforms.   
     While more popular reforms tend to get adopted first, less popular reforms  are delayed. 
Perhaps the least popular reforms are the restructuring and closing of loss - making enterprises, which 
has generally been quite delayed. Clearly, restructuring involves the loss of substantial rents for well -
organized groups of the population,  and it requires countervailing political momentum.  
     Political economy can also be used to shed light on potential policy mistakes that involve 
sequencing. For example, one can wonder whether the adverse domestic reaction to price liberalization 
in Russi a in particular might not have been avoided if Russian reforms had first favored the emergence 
of a small private industrial and service sector.
4     
  As another example related to Russia, it might have been a sequencing mistake for Boris 
Yeltsin not to have  taken advantage of the August 1991 putsch to push immediately for further 
political reform like new congressional elections and a new Constitution prior to further economic   20
reform, using the window of opportunity provided by the failed putsch. Such politi cal changes did not 
take place until December 1993, nearly two years after the beginning of economic reforms. The 
population had by then already suffered from the shock of liberalization. A possible "honeymoon" for 
reformers had already been dissipated and  elections expressed important discontent and confusion 
among the population with the party of the extreme - right wing figure Vladimir Zhirinovsky receiving 
an impressive number of votes.  
     Yet another set of sequencing issues arise with regard to mass pr ivatization as it was 
implemented in countries like Russia and the Czech republic before a viable de novo private sector had 
established itself.  This mistake was avoided by the policy of gradual sales followed in Poland and 
Hungary. Mass privatization cre ated a sudden and strong concentration of economic power among 
insider managers. Especially given that socialist enterprises were larger than capitalist firms, the person 
who gains economic control over such an enterprise acquires important power. In parti cular, there is 
considerable scope for abuse of minority shareholders. This abuse of power then leads to low 
confidence in the stock market and low liquidity, shrinking the stock market, as observed in the Czech 
Republic and Russia.    
  More importantly, th e sudden shift of economic power to insider managers may also make it 
easier for them to capture politicians and regulators. Insider managers use the threat of reducing 
economic activity and destroying jobs  --  or even use outright bribery  --  to extract sub sidies or favorable 
legislation. Politicians can respond to such subsidies under such plausible and popular rubrics as saving 
jobs and providing a better business climate. However, these influences will lead to more corruption 
within the state, weak tax en forcement (especially for large firms, Campos, 1999), weak law 
enforcement, and so on. Large insider interest groups may then block legal reform that would reduce 
their power or undermine their interests.   
  Over time, this strong economic power is likely t o lead to enormous inequality of wealth 
(Alexeev, 1999) which is likely to increase political instability. Political instability in turn reinforces the 
short - term perspectives of managers and insider owners: they will prefer to find ways to transfer   21
corpor ate assets to their private use rather than invest in the long - term future of the enterprises they 
control.   
     In the Czech Republic, these negative effects of mass privatization can be partly offset by 
prospects for joining the European Union. Those pro spects may help generate a minimum of discipline 
in law enforcement and focus expectations in the right direction (Roland and Verdier, 1999b). But in 
Russia, the dynamic effects of mass privatization will likely have negative long - term effects.  
 
Winners an d Losers  
     Fidrmuc (1998a,b) has analyzed the political support for reforms in the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary during various years in the 1990s. He analyzes the effects of economic 
variables resulting from reforms on the votes received  by different parties. His main findings are that 
the support for reformist parties is negatively affected by unemployment and by the proportion of 
retirees, blue collar and agricultural workers, but is positively affected by the existing size of the priva te 
sector, and a higher share of white - collar workers or of people with university education. These 
findings indicate that there is a regular pattern of perceived winners and losers from reform, and that 
political support for reforms depends on the balance  between losers and winners.   
  These results help to explain one of the ongoing political economy puzzles in central Europe: 
How has the government of Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic managed to be relatively more stable, 
compared to governments of other  transition countries? One reason is surely that the Czech republic 
has managed to maintain a lower unemployment rate as compared to other transition economies. This 
issue analyzed in depth by a number of authors: for example, Ham, Svejnar and Terrell (199 8), 
Munich, Svejnar and Terrell (1998) and Sorm and Terrell (1999).   
       
The Trade - off Between the Speed of Reforms and the Size of Budgetary Transfers  
     Political economy theory suggests the possibility of a trade - off between the speed of reforms 
and t he net present value of compensation transfers: namely, faster reforms will involve higher   22
compensation costs. This issue can be highlighted by comparing restructuring policies in East Germany 
and other transition economies. In the former East Germany, res tructuring proceeded very fast with 
massive layoffs at an early stage of transition. Employment fell by nearly one half between 1989 and 
1992 (Sinn and Sinn, 1993). However, this policy has been associated with massive transfers from 
West Germany. Net tran sfers to East Germany were 65 percent of East German GNP in 1991, 65.5 
percent in 1992, and 76.5 percent in 1993 (Gros and Steinherr, 1995)! Transfers at comparably high 
levels have continued throughout the 1990s. In contrast, in central and eastern Europe , where such 
massive transfers were not available, layoffs have been understandably more gradual.   
     Coricelli (1995) claims that "faster" reformers in central and eastern Europe, such as Poland, 
Hungary or the Czech Republic,  have been facing higher in creases in social expenditures like 
unemployment benefits and pensions due to a higher level of restructuring, as compared to "slower" 
reformers who have maintained higher levels of subsidies in ailing industries. Similarly, Pirtillä (2000) 
finds that a fa ster rate of restructuring in transition economies is associated with a worsening fiscal 
stance. But these facts do not quite settle the matter. In economic terms, the key question is not 
whether faster reforms are associated with a higher level of compens ating transfers, but whether faster 
reforms raise the net present value of compensating transfers, or only the timing of these transfers. 
Evidence on this point is weak.  
  However, the role of the social safety net in helping overcome political constraints  is quite 
clear. In the case of central European countries like Poland (Keane and Prasad, 2000) and the Czech 
Republic (Garner and Terrell, 1998), the social safety net has helped to mitigate the negative effects of 
transition on income inequality, especial ly for the most vulnerable proportions of the population.   
       
The Role of Political Institutions  
    The role of particular political institutions in facilitating the adoption and implementation of 
reforms is being given increasing attention, on the basis  of some intriguing and perplexing results. 
Recent empirical analysis by Hellman (1998) and EBRD (1999) has found that a stronger executive   23
branch of government tends to be associated with less progress in reform. However, there tends to be a 
positive corr elation between the broadness of coalition and the progress of reforms. These findings 
tend to contradict the conventional wisdom, based on empirical findings from the political economy 
literature on stabilization and fiscal policy around the world, that b road coalition governments and 
weak executives are an obstacle to reform (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 
1992; Spolaore, 2000; Alesina and Perotti, 1995). Can this apparent contradiction be resolved?   
     One possible interpret ation is that there is value to consensus - building created by broader 
coalitions and more closely checked executives. If reforms are accepted by broader coalitions, perhaps 
there is less chance they can be reversed. To the extent that expectations of refor ms being reversed may 
have negative effects on economic decisions such as domestic and foreign investment, then such 
reforms may have more positive effects. But if this is true, then how does one explain the result that 
broader coalitions are typically uns uccessful in macroeconomic stabilization and fiscal reform around 
the rest of the world? Broad coalitions tend to paralyze decision - making, due to holdup power of some 
groups and to wars of attrition within the coalition (Alesina and Drazen, 1992). Indeed,  broader 
coalitions do not necessarily imply that it is more difficult to reverse a decision, since broader coalitions 
are often more fragile and last less long.  
     Another possible interpretation is that the population is eager to get reforms implemented , 
whereas the politicians and those holding office are opposed to it. In that case, closer checks on the 
executive and frequent elections are a way to force the politicians to move, whereas politicians with 
more discretion would choose to block reforms. Th e main objection to this view is that there is little 
evidence that the public typically leads politicians or that politicians typically lead the public; instead, 
there is considerable heterogeneity in terms of support for reforms both among the population  and 
among politicians in power.   
     In my view, the most likely explanation for the positive correlation between progress of 
reforms and broadness of coalitions and weakness of the executive is that countries where it was the 
easiest to push for democrat ic reforms are in all likelihood also the countries where resistance to   24
economic reforms was relatively smaller. Conversely, in countries with less initial support for reforms, 
it is quite likely that both democratic reform and economic reform are less adv anced. If this pattern 
holds true, then differences in initial conditions of reform are what determine the intensity of political 
constraints, and thus the initial choice of political institutions, at least as much as the initial choice of 
policies. This m eans that the choice of institutions like a weak or strong executive, or the institutional 
frameworks that require or don't require broad coalitions, is endogenous to the transition process itself.   
  Economists have tended to limit their examination of ini tial conditions to initial  economic  
conditions (for example, Åslund et al., 1996; Popov, 2000; Havrylyshyn et al., 1998; Berg et al., 1999; 
Krueger and Ciolko, 1998; Heybey and Murrell, 1999). It becomes necessary to have a more 
comprehensive picture of in itial conditions, including political and sociological variables, to have a 
more precise idea of their effect on the initial choice of institutions as well as on economic policies 
(themselves influenced by the political institutions adopted). One important  variable which has not been 
studied seriously so far by economists is the strength of the non - Communist elites at the beginning of 
transition. A closely related point was made earlier, in discussing the strength of civil society in different 
transition co untries. There is a striking difference between Poland, where the Catholic church and the 
Solidarity trade union counterbalanced the Communist elites, and Russia, where little counterbalance 
existed to the former members of the Communist ruling class who e ngaged in a frenzy of asset -




Economists often refer to the transition economies of the former Soviet Union and central and eastern 
Europe. But for these countries, far more than th e economy is involved in the transition. They are also 
creating their institutions of democracy and governance, including the executive, legislative and 
judiciary branches of government; a free press; new social norms and values; an openness to private 
org anizations and to entrepreneurship; a network of regulators; and a new network of contractual   25
relationships, both domestic and abroad. The economic transition is intimately related with these 
institutional transformations.  
  In this setting, economists have  often gone astray in their analysis of transition economies by 
examining only economic factors and ignoring these deep institutional transformations. Successful 
institutions of capitalism are already present in advanced economies and we tend to take them  for 
granted when reasoning on economies in transition or on developing economies where such institutions 
are absent. The transition experience has therefore very much reinforced the institutionalist perspective 
in economics and a shift in emphasis in econo mic thinking, from the analysis of markets and price 
theory to that of contracting and to the legal, social and political environment of contracting. 
Moreover, transition has also forced us to think about institutions not in a static way but in a dynamic 
w ay: how momentum for reform is created, how institutions can evolve but also how momentum can 
be lost and how one can get stuck in inefficient institutions. These questions, addressed by the political 
economy perspective, have become central in understandi ng how successful capitalism can emerge. 
Transition countries have started this process of change from specific initial conditions but the 
questions addressed by transition go far beyond the transition process itself.     26
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Endnotes  
   
1 .  The agenda - setting hypothesis stands in contrast to the approac h to competitive voting associated 
with the work of Anthony Downs, where policies are proposed by competing candidates. The agenda -
setting hypothesis avoids problems of cycling in voting (and absence of equilibria) when the policy 
space is multidimensional  .  
2 .  Compensation packages need not necessarily involve financial transfers. A number of individual 
reforms or reform packages may be bundled together so as to gain majority support (Martinelli and 
Tommasi, 1997).   
 
3 .  Specifically, 1984 is the year in Ch ina where dual - track price liberalization, discussed below, was 
implemented in industry.  
4 .  Russian reforms tended to start in that direction under in the 19809s under Mikhail Gorbachev. The 
development of cooperatives in the late 1980s, for example, was a n embryo of small private sector 
development. However, in Russia that sector was still very underdeveloped when price liberalization 






















   Table 1. Some facts on governments in transition countries.  
Country 
Time of first free  
elections 
















 of parties in  
government 
Percentage of  
Left and  
Central left-wing 
governments 
Left and  
Central left -wing 
Governments as  
a percentage  
of time 
Percentage  
of reelected  
governments 
 
parliamentary                 
Bulgaria  June 1990-June 2001  31.6 21  49 2.15  50  58  20 
Czech republic  June 1990-June 1998  32 18.2  12 3.2  0  0  50 
Estonia  March 1990-March 1999  36 12.9  12 2.2  0  0  0 
Hungary  March 1990-May 1998  48 48  48 2.7  50  50  0 
Poland  August 1989-Sept. 2001  36.5 17.9  24 3.4  29  33  0 
Romania  May 1990-Nov.2000  42 15.3  12 2.9  71  71  75 
Slovakia  Jan. 1993-Sept. 1998  32.7 17.5  48 2.5  100  100  0 
Slovenia  Dec. 1992-Oct. 2000  47 23.3  24 3  0  0  100 
presidential               
Russia  Dec. 1993-Dec. 99  36 10.7  9.6-  -  -  - 
Ukraine  March 1994-May 1998  48 16.4  12.5-  -  -  - 
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